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My undergraduate and graduate education in resource and
environmental  economics, my time in  academia,  and my
time workin g in government have led to a particular
understanding of the outwardly mysterious ways that
society  makes water and land resource decisions.  For me
decisions on water allocation, water project spending, and
water pollution  control reg ulation ha ve been  and will
continue to be, based on negotiation and bargaining –
“dealm aking.”   The deal describes choices made in a
market-like process (ex. water rights exchanges) in an
administrative process, or in the political arena.  Deals are
conditioned by the bargaining conventions and power
relationship s amon g nego tiating parties. 
When  I was a student, the deal was out of favor even
among econom ists.  It was assumed that the give and take
of bargained outcomes would serve narrowly self-
interested participan ts to a nego tiation wh ile the pub lic
interest would  be igno red.  The re was a se nse that de als
made in markets almost always failed to produce efficient
or equitable allocation of water resources.  Advocates for
water rights and pollution discharge rights markets were
part of  a fr inge element in the academic community.
Instead, governm ent spend ing and  regulation  was (alm ost)
always necessary  for achiev ing a socia lly superior water
allocation.  However, the deals made in government
decisionmaking processes also were suspect.  The
literature decried th e “pork  barrel”  and the bankruptcy of
interest gro up politics. 
Suspicion of markets, of politicians, and o f bureau crats
encouraged economists and other analysts to a dvoca te
technical analyses that would expose the inefficiency and
inequity  of water de als being stru ck.  Perhaps reflecting a
progressive era faith in expertise, the water resources
economics literature after the 196 0s enco uraged  econom ic
analysts  to mak e objective  and ration al calculation s to
define the public interest that could not be established by
market exchange and to reign in the irrational world of
political deals.
A broad m ultidisciplinary background and opportunities
to work in both academia and government would not let
me accept this view of the world.  I believed then and
believe now that advocating markets for efficient and
equitable  water resource allocations is a job of the
economist.  I believed then and believe now that the
political deal is the way democra tic societies define the
public  interest.  I believ ed then a nd believ e now th at the
job of the policy econom ist is to craft econ omic
argum ents and analysis to help bargaining parties discover
new ways to think about the decision being made, and not
to dictate the best decision.  Economic analysts who treat
the political deal as the enemy of their calculations for
defining the public interest will find their work either
ignored or coop ted to justify predetermined positions
taken by the d eal makers.
Recen tly I have noticed that suspicion of the deal has
given way to a certain respect for negotiation as the best
process for water resourc e decision makin g.  In the pa st,
deal making was the enem y of the p ublic intere st.  Today,
deal making both in markets and in politics has been
equated to the public interest.  Indeed, it is now
mainstream to promote deals made in markets for
allocating water use rights and pollution discharge
allowances.   To be sure, advocacy for market-like policy
continues to be viewed with suspicion.  My recent
experience with desig ning w etland cre dit sales mark ets
and in shaping the institutional conditions for allowance
trading in water quality programs reminds me that making
the argument for markets rem ains a difficult task.  (See:
Shabman, L., K. Stephenson, and  P. Scodari, 1998.
“Wetlands Credit Sales as a Strategy for Achieving No
Net Loss:  Th e  Limitatio ns of Re gulatory  Cond itions.”
Wetlands.  18.3  (September); and, Step henson , K.,
Shabman, L., and L. Geyer, 1999.  “Watershed-based
Effluent Allowance Trading:  Identifying the Statutory
and Regulatory   Barriers to Implementation.”  The
Environmental Lawyer. June 1999).  Nonetheless, the
number of operating market-like programs in water rights,
in water quality, in air quality and in habitat management
continu es to grow . 
Perhaps more striking than the increased acceptance of
market-like water policy has been the acceptance of deal
making for government decisionmaking.  This so called
“collaborative decisionmaking” is openly advocated for
design of  pollution control regulations, for water rights
allocations and for hydropower dam re-licensing.  The
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shift to deal m aking is an  effort to expedite water
management decisions that in recent years have been
characterized by stalemate and legal delays.  The new
understanding of “watershed management” offers the
most  intriguing  examp le of the na tion’s chang ing goa ls
for water management and the acceptance of the deal for
makin g decision s.  
First consider the new understanding of the purpose of
watershed management.  At mid-century President
Truman’s  Water P olicy Co mmiss ion linked  the econ omic
prosper ity of the nation to watershed management.  The
Commission reported that “ . . . the Am erican pe ople are
awakening to the fact that riv er basins ar e econo mic units;
that many problems center around the use and control of
water resources . . . .”  When  river basin  and watershed (I
will use the terms as synonym s) management was viewed
as an engine of economic development, watershed
management was expected to remove the tails from the
distribution of hydr ologic ev ents; hyd rologic v ariability
prevented areas from reaching their full ec onom ic
potenti al.  In a well managed watershed, the “average”
flow would become the “normal” flow through the
development and operation of  reservoirs.  A well
managed watershed would be one where wet soils were
drained and water would be d elivered to dry area s.
Watershed management was achieved by water
development projects (d ams, ch annels, levees, and
diversions) for flood control, navigation, hydropower,
municipal and industrial water supply, and irrigation
purpo ses.  
In the last 30 years “de-engineering” the nation’s
watersheds has com e to define  watershe d man agem ent.
Recognizing that chemical water quality improvement
alone  can  not,  in  the  language  of  the  Clean Water
Act,  “. . . restore the physical, chemical, and biological
integrity  of the nati ons waters,”  there has b een a call to
return the hydrologic variability necessary to support the
living resources of watersheds.  V ariability in river flows,
overbank flooding and drying of the fringe areas of rivers,
lakes and estuaries, and protecting isolated pockets of wet
areas have been associated with the environmental
restoration of watersh eds.  Watershed restoration actions
mean putting the tails back on the distribution of
hydro logic events, by rem oving or reo perating dam s,
putting meanders back in straightened channels,  breaching
levees, and abandoning agriculture on  farmed w etlands.
Restoration may mean that some of the now valued
watershed services will be lost (or produced at higher
cost).  Restoration may mean (for example) less flood
protection for some properties, less navigation for some
shippers, less irrigation water for some farmers, higher
electric rates for some commercial and residential
customers,  higher timber p rices for home builders, or
reduced em ploymen t in some com munities.
The purpose  of watershed management has been
redefined, and so to o have th e accepte d decisio nmaking
procedures.   In the past watershed deal making was
disguised by a pretense that decisions were directed by the
objective calculations and  comp arisons of c osts with
benefits.  Today, in a radical shift from th e past,
watershed management programs open ly call for
collaborative decisionmaking (bargaining and negotiation)
to guide watershed restoration decisions.  The decision to
be made is whether the environ mental gains (b enefits)
from watershed restoration offset the value of the lost
services (costs).  Eco nomists m ight be inc lined to  prom ote
benefit/cost analysis for guiding this decision.  However,
I doubt th at environmental benefit analysis will make a
signif icant contribution to wa tershed re storation
decisionm aking. 
I am not suggesting that participants in collaborative
restoration decisionmaking have no interest in  or need for
analysis.  The analyst’s task is to help  the participants in
the decision process discover and reveal their preferences
and their willingness to make trade-offs (i.e. determine
benefits).  A useful economic analysis  will  illuminate
the costs of  restorat ion and not  seek to measure the
environmental benefits.  Costs are more than financial
outlays of gove rnmen t.  From a current watershed
condition economists must describe the “opportunity
costs”  of  alternative  levels,  scales,  and  locations for
restoration.   Restoration   opportunity   costs    include:
1) direct life-cycle financial outlays by government and
individu als, 2) existing power, irrigation, flood risk, and
other services that w ould be  reduced  or lost with
restoration.  By focusing negotiator’s attention on whether
a propos ed restora tion action  is worth its op portunity  cost,
restoration “benefits” are discovered and established by
the decisio n proce ss. 
I am aware  of interest in and use  of analyses that compare
changes in a physical measure of the environmental
services of restoration  (ex. increm ental imp rovem ents in
salmon population chan ges or in a w ater quality
parameter) with opportunity costs.  I am also aware th at
calculations of enviro nmen tal benefits (ex. the money
equivalent value of the use and nonuse values of a
salmon) might b e welc omed by those w ho support
restoration – if the reported benefits are large enough to
suppor t their position .  The same benefit calculations are
rejected when th ey are “to o small” to  suppor t a
preconceived position.  In general, I have found th at
estimates of enviro nmen tal restoration  benefits  are used to
defend an established barg aining po sition wh ile
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oppor tunity  cost analysis helps neg otiators dete rmine th eir
position.  
Accura te opportunity co st analysis makes another
contribution to a negotiation-based decisionmaking
process.  Most deals w ill not be made u nless losers are
compensated for their losses.  Com pensation  to
commercial fisherme n, to forest p roducts firm s, to
irrigators, to naviga tion interest, a nd to others may be
needed for any plan to be politically accepted.  If
compensation is going to be offere d, affected interests
have an incentive to inflate their d amag e claims to
maximize the payment received.  If comp ensation is not
going to be offe red there a lso is an ince ntive to inflate
damage claims to make the opportu nity cost of restoration
appear unacceptably high.  Of course, restoration
advocates will attempt to “prove” that the opportunity
costs are trivia l, regardless o f the real op portunity  costs. 
Both  for helping the decision process define the values
derived from restoration and for helping direct
compensation, economic analysts should assure that
oppor tunity  costs are accurately assessed and include
more than financial o utlays.  Eco nomists  will be sensitive
to the mark et adjustm ents that w ill occur.  Commercial
fishermen will switch species, use low er cost harvest
methods,  and find new sources of emplo yment if fish
harvest quotas are enforced.  If restoration curtails power
generating capacity, changes will be made within the
power generation firms, in power marketing and on the
demand side, which will minimize (not eliminate) the cost
of replacement power.  Higher timber prices will dampen
demand and encourage more technically efficient use of
wood materials  in construction so the  rise in construction
costs will be dampened (for an example of such work see:
G. Edward Dickey, “Grain Transportation After Partial
Removal  of the Four Lower Snake River Dam s,”
http://www.americanrivers.org /snakedam-pres s.h tml,
accessed  Decem ber 8, 19 99). 
Collaborative decisionmaking is a new endeavor.  In
specific  instances there may be unclear rules of procedure
and representation, limited understanding of the best ways
to introduce analysis into the process, and insufficient
incentives for certain parties to pa rticipate.  Eco nomic
analysts  should p ay increa sed analy tical attention to the
bargaining process and to rules for structuring that
process.  For example, some negotiated solutions have not
been tying ben eficiaries to co sts; instead costs are being
shifted to unrepresented general taxpayers.  If
beneficiaries do not bear the costs of the decisions they
seek to influence, the potential for cost shifting to others
will make th e outcom es optim al for the partie s to the
negotiation but come at a cost to the society at large.
What may b e emerg ing is a new “ green” p ork barr el.
More generally, the recent professional interest in game
theory applications can contribute to the design of
collaborative processes that will yield efficient and
equitable  (defined  in man y ways ) outcom es. 
Changes that have occurred in what we accept as
legitimate  decisionmaking processes are creating exciting
new opportu nities for ana lysts.  The design of practical
rules for imp lementi ng market-like institutions is an on-
going challenge.  The ne ed to focus on  opportunity co st
analysis  and the design of negotiation rules for
collaborative decisionmaking will keep a nalysts  gainfully
employed for the foreseeable future.
